The Game of Arranged Marriages by Anchalia, Nikunj et al.

The Game of Arranged Marriages 
                                                       Nikunj Anchalia, Petra Ackerlauer & Usha Kannan 
 
A recent article in the Times of India (Desai, 2009) discusses the persistent existence of 
arranged marriages in India over time. Surprisingly, the educated middle class is 
experiencing a slightly increasing rate of arranged marriages indicating that it still is a 
widely accepted way of finding a partner.  But the advancement of technology has 
definitely transformed arranged marriages (CNN, 2008). A common way to find a potential 
spouse these days is through online matchmaking portals like shaadi.com (14 million 
profiles) or bharatmatrimony.com (1.5 million profiles).  
  Relying on romance or love when entering a marriage involves trying to transform a 
relationship from its present state into a long-term committed union. The problem is that 
even though romance may facilitate love, it does not necessarily guarantee a long term 
bond. Arranged marriages, on the other hand, simply try to transform an uncertain future 
outcome into a secure long-term contract based on specific economic, cultural, educational 
and social factors associated with the potential partners (Desai, 2009). This paper analyses 
arranged marriages in the context of game theory, highlighting the principles of utility 
maximization , principal–agent theory and economies of scale . 
 
The Marriage Game – Love and Arranged Marriages 
A game theoretic directed analysis of the marriage market studies strategic behaviours, 
acknowledging the expected behaviour from others and recognizing the mutual 
interdependence between players. 
  The figures below show the payoff matrices for a game analysis of the marriage market 
within an environment of certainty and uncertainty. The games have two strategies (get 
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married or stay single) and three possible outcomes - both players can choose to marry, 
both can stay single or one gets married but the other stays single, thus not resulting in 
marriage for at least one player. We assume that one of the main objectives of getting 
married is to increase utility compared to staying single. 
 
FIGURE 1: NO UNCERTAINTY 
  Woman 
  Marry Stay single 
Man 
Marry (10, 10) (-10, 0) 
Stay single (0, -10) (0, 0) 
 
  In a situation without uncertainty, where both the woman and the man want to get 
married, staying single has a payoff, of zero. If they both get married, their utility rises by 
+10. If one stays single and the other plans on getting married, the latter has a utility of 0 
whereas the former has a payoff of -10. The reason for this is that the partner wanting to 
get married places a reasonable amount of effort into his/her strategy and thus is worse off 
than if he/she would have pursued the “stay single” strategy from the start. In this game, it 
is evident that getting married is the dominant strategy for both players. The Nash 
equilibrium is therefore the happy outcome where both players get married, which is also a 
Pareto optimal decision. 
 
FIGURE 2: WITH UNCERTAINTY 
  Woman 
  Marry Stay single 
Man 
Marry (10p, 10p) (0, 5) 
Stay single (5, 0) (5, 5) 
 
  If one takes into account the uncertainty of the players around wanting to get married, 
the game looks slightly different. Now, if both want to stay single, their utility increases by 
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+5 because they were not certain about the increased benefits of getting married anyway.  
Strictly speaking, it is not necessary to have this pay off from staying single, but we feel 
that it reinforces the idea of uncertainty more vividly.   
  If one player wants to marry whereas the other stays single, the player staying single still 
receives a payoff  of 5, but the player who was unsuccessful in finding a partner suffers a 
payoff of 0 due to costs incurred in trying to get married unsuccessfully. If they both 
pursue the ‘marry’ strategy, their payoff amounts to 10 times the value of p, where p is the 
probability of the marriage being a success. This parameter represents having a lasting, 
loving and fulfilling marriage. Assume that  is the probability of getting married and (1 – 
) is the probability of staying single. Then, the expected utility of the man (E(Um)) who 
chooses to marry is:  
E(Um) =  x 10 x p + (1- ) x 0 =  x 10 x p + 0 =  x 10 x p 
Whereas the expected utility of a man choosing to stay single is: 
E(Us) =  x 5 + (1- ) x 5 =  x 5 + 5 -  x 5 = 5 
  It follows that if ( x 10 x p) < 5, the man chooses to stay single as this gives him a higher 
expected utility. If ( x 10 x p) = 5, the man is indifferent to either marrying or staying 
single. If ( x 10 x p) > 5, the man is better off getting married. 
   
With love marriages, attaining a high  value is harder because finding a suitable partner 
usually demands more personal resources (time, money, commitment) than with arranged 
marriages. This is due to the lack of elaborate screening processes, helpful agents or 
dowries. The man or woman looks for a potential partner by themselves and is less likely to 
be influenced by rational materialistic factors, like the bank account, family history or 
potential for professional development. The existence of intangible aspects is much more 
important, for example that ‘gut feeling’, ‘butterflies in one’s stomach’ or, indeed, ‘love at 
first sight’. Without those, the probability of getting married () decreases immensely. 
If these feelings are mutual and both want to tie the knot, the wedding takes place.    
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  Unfortunately, the size or strength of these emotions does not invariably increase the 
probability of the marriage being a long-term success. The challenge for love marriages is 
the transformation of the fleeting concept of love into lasting commitment and caring. In 
order to achieve this and consequently increase p, the couple discusses future expectations 
about children, jobs and lifestyle before getting married. In this way, compromises can be 
struck in advance and an uncertain future can be made a little more predictable, thus 
increasing p. However, a high risk still exists that some topic has been overseen or not 
answered truthfully or that opinions will change over time. The man/woman is the only 
judge of character of the potential partner compared to arranged marriages where a 
number of family members and matchmakers can voice their opinions about the proposed 
union. 
  With arranged marriages, the players try to increase their  by choosing partners with 
similar educational, family, cultural and religious backgrounds. This might also provide 
foundations for a successful marriage, thus increasing p.  
  Factors influencing the size of  include the ability of the matchmaker to find a suitable 
partner, the amount of dowry and the potential benefits of economies of scale when joining 
the families. 
 
Matchmaking and the Practice of Dowry  
Handing over the search for a potential spouse to an intermediary can be analysed by using 
the idea of a principal–agent relationship. The principal, for example the man, hands over 
the task of looking for a bride to his intermediaries – people he trusts will be able to find a 
suitable match. These most likely include parents, grandparents and other close relatives. 
They swarm out and try to gather as much information as possible about the potential 
brides and, after rejecting unsuitable prospects and investigating promising ones more 
carefully, present the principal with their findings. He then can choose whom he wants to 
pursue. Problems arise during the search process as the principal can not be sure as to 
whether the agents will place the same emphasis on certain values as he would have done 
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in arriving at the final list of prospects. There is a certain degree of self interest of an agent 
which might result in the prospective bride possessing personality traits or values the 
agent likes but the principal does not appreciate or value quite as highly. A mother might 
look for a complacent, quiet daughter-in-law whereas her son might not fully agree to this. 
As a result,  decreases as the guy will not marry a woman who does not possess his ideal 
attributes. 
  In order to minimize this problem of self interest, mechanisms could be designed to 
induce agents to act in their principal’s interest, for example by introducing incentives. In 
an arranged marriage it should be incentive enough to have a son’s best interest and 
happiness at heart. In reality though, the amount of dowry offered plays a crucial role in 
the selection process.  
  Both  and p are influenced by the amount of dowry offered by the bride’s family for the 
groom. This was not always the case. During the times of the existence of Swayamvara 
ceremonies1, the choice of husband did not depend on the amount of dowry but fell upon 
the potential grooms themselves who had to successfully complete tasks laid upon them by 
the girl’s father. 
  The dowry system developed because the groom was more and more looked upon as an 
asset, generating capital and support for old age, whereas the bride was looked upon as a 
cost, consuming additional resources. She would be a home carer and not generate future 
tangible capital. Therefore an arranged marriage was looked upon as a barter system where 
each family has a good to exchange. In order to have a balanced exchange the bride was 
married to the groom based on an agreed payment. This is called the dowry system. Since 
the bride was considered a cost she had no bargaining power when it came to choosing her 
future husband. 

1 During the era of kings and Queens, Swayamvara’s were held where the daughter’s father called princes 
from neighbouring kingdoms to try to win his daughter’s hand in marriage.
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  The dowry actively influences the level of  as the amount of dowry might compensate for 
the lack of personal attributes of the potential spouse: the higher the dowry, the higher the 
probability of them getting married. However, the effect on p is questionable. The 
emergence of websites like idontwantdowry.com shows the increasing resentment of 
dowries. For this set of people, the acceptance of dowries might decrease the success of a 
marriage, thus reducing p. 
  Modernization has empowered women through education, legal reforms, political power 
and personal autonomy (Kumari, 2004). More  women are now working in high positions 
and supporting their families, this bargaining power has shifted in favour of the bride. This 
trend increases the  value from the bride’s perspective. A recent example is Nisha Sharma 
(The Economist, 2003) who called off her wedding after the groom’s family demanded an 
extra dowry on the wedding day. 
  A form of dowry practice where the groom pays dowry exists in some countries and is 
called ‘Bride Service’. It is the net transfer of labour from a man to his prospective father-in 
law in order to obtain permission to marry his daughter. This can be looked at as a man’s 
daughter being used ‘as bait’ in order to obtain the services of the son-in law, implying that 
the daughter is an economic asset controlled by the father, that can be released for a 
certain quantity of labour (Bossen, 1988). The man provides services in order to influence 
the potential bride’s  which would result in them getting married.  
 
Economies of Scale in Marriage 
Another factor that has an influence on  and p is the potential benefits associated with an 
arranged marriage that are generated by economies of scale. In general, the gains of 
marrying compared to staying single depend positively on the partners’ incomes and the 
relative difference in wage rates (Becker, 1973). This means that the higher the difference 
in income levels and wage rates, the more likely they are to gain extra profits from getting 
married because of the benefits of specialization and the ensuing economies of scale. In 
general, marriage encourages the division of labour on principles similar to comparative 
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advantage and gains from trade. Whitehead and Popenoe (The Economist, 2007) put it like 
this: "Individuals can develop those skills in which they excel, leaving others to their 
partner."  
  On a micro-level, or the husband-wife household unit, the husband is usually the main 
income earner and the wife is responsible for the household and caring for the children. 
Thus, they specialise in certain tasks which results in an economy of scale, as the husband 
saves time not doing household work and the woman does not have to earn an extra 
income. They are better off together than they would be by themselves, based on the 
assumption that the wife chooses to stay at home. This applies not only to arranged but 
also to love marriages. 
  Additionally, arranged marriages experience economies of scale on a macro-level. An 
arranged marriage is not merely the joining of two individuals but of two families, 
extending to family networks and offering salient support in professional development, 
finances, household and relationship issues. It also results in the development of new 
alliances and a redistribution of power amongst families. It is a mentality based on the 
assumption that ‘the sum is better than its parts’. The more people in the couples’ family 
network, the higher their economic, financial and emotional stability which is seen as the 
basis of a successful marriage. Thus, an increase of the economies of scale effect positively 
influences p. 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
To sum up, the game of arranged marriages is such that  and p are influenced by the 
expertise of the agent, the prospect of dowry and the other benefits marriage entails. A 
high  is the prerequisite of experiencing a high p resulting in a successful marriage in 
addition to the role of compatibility, mutual respect and appreciation. Consequently, the 
way a marriage is arranged and created, influences the probability of a successful lasting 
bond. 
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  Arranged marriages try to influence  and p values more aggressively than love marriages. 
By meticulously planning and selecting the future partner (high ), families want to ensure 
that the couple can achieve the highest p possible. To the extent that the principal-agent 
relationship this form of marriages creates has fewer contradictions the probability of 
genuine marital success becomes higher. On the other hand, love marriages include a high 
degree of uncertainty about the long-term success of the union (p) which is also reflected 
in the high divorce rates of this kind of marriage. However, initial happiness is higher than 
in arranged marriages due to the completely voluntary character of the bond. It seems 
there might be a trade-off between short-term happiness and long-term success. Men and 
women agreeing to an arranged marriage seem to have recognized this trade-off and 
accept the fact that they might not attain a high level of happiness at the beginning but 
continue to place their trust in the institution of arranged marriage hoping for the future 
to be one of security and stability. 
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